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CHANGING, NOT BALANCING, THE MARKET:
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T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare
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Now that a global market supposedly reigns triumphant, virtually every progressive
project stands accused of violating market principles. But whether progressives attempt to
complement the market or to conform to it, the demands of the market appear to sharply
constrain progressive politics. "Market" challenges to progressive ideas are the latest version of
the classic regressive argument that nothing important in law and policy can change.1

The very division between "market" and "non-market" goals works strategically to
undermine progressive policies, regardless of which side of this divide progressives choose to
advocate. Progressives should reject the question whether or not progressive policies are
consistent with a market approach. Instead, we should ask what kinds of markets, in whose
1

interests, deserve public support?

The persistent argument that "the market" constrains progressive goals gets its substantial
power in part from a rhetorical strategy that places those constraints beyond political and
analytical questioning. Even though many legal scholars and policymakers give lip service to
the idea that markets and states are thoroughly entangled, many are nonetheless content to place
much of the responsibility for a world of hideous inequality and violence on "market forces" that
elude human agency and interest. The time is particularly ripe for re-engaging the critical legal
challenge of imagining, over and over again, how some important things might indeed change
for the better2 - even those important things identified as "markets."

I. Challenging the Distinction between Equity and Efficiency

Progressive policies rest on the belief that government support for broad-based economic
security enhances societal well-being. Against this ideal stands the "free market" credo that
government abstention from broad-based economic protection is the key to societal well-being.
But the difference between these opposing visions is not that one takes a "social" or "nonmarket" approach and one an "economic" or "market" approach. Instead, these opposite visions
represent the difference between an egalitarian and anti-egalitarian approach to political
economy. So-called "market" arguments recover and re-invigorate traditions of race, gender,
sexual, and class inequality under the more legitimate-sounding name of "economic efficiency."
Outside the United States, this challenge to egalitarian goals is commonly translated not as "the
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market" but as "neoliberalism" or "neocolonialism," recognizing the issue is not "economics" but
one particularly problematic economic ideology.

This neoliberal economic ideology claims to promote the normative principle of
"efficiency" distinct from an alternative normative goal of "equitable (re)distribution." 3
"Efficiency" means maximizing the economic pie, while equity means dividing the economic
pie. The imagined choice between "efficiency" and "equity" values creates a double bind for
progressive support for welfare state and regulatory state policies. Progressives can choose
"efficiency," which risks sacrificing equality in order to support economic growth. Or,
progressives can choose "redistribution," which risks sacrificing economic growth to support
social goals, leaving a smaller economic pie with smaller slices available to satisfy those social
needs. Either way, progressive goals lose.4 If the free market is by definition the system that
maximizes overall well-being, then redistribution -- which by definition diverges from "free
market" resource allocation -- inherently risks detracting from overall well-being.5

But what distinguishes "overall" well-being -- larger pies for everyone -- from partisan
gain -- larger slices of the pie for some at others' expense? The term "efficiency" distinct from
"equity" simply means the "public" interest distinct from "private" or "special" interests -- a
distinction that escapes objective calculation. However diligently legal and policy experts add
up "costs" and "benefits" of various policy options to arrive at an "overall" sum of net social gain
distinct from private gain, that sum boils down to subjective moral judgments about what counts
as a cost versus a benefit, and whose costs and benefits count for how much.
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"Efficiency" is not a goal that progressive policies should "balance" or "accommodate"
with the goal of equitable distribution, because so-called efficiency concerns are inevitably,
inextricably about equity. By conceiving the progressive project as "weighing" efficiency
against redistribution, we concede a crucial part of the argument -- that progressive goals are not
about advancing the public interest. Before debating how much to balance particular interests in
dividing the pie against the aggregate interest in a bigger pie, we should insist on debating the
more fundamental question of whose views of whose particular interests count in defining that
bigger pie -- the overall public interest.

Take the 1999 meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, where a newly
coalesced activist movement challenged neoliberal trade policies as a major barrier to
progressive goals.6 Most mainstream U.S. commentary accused the protests of recklessly
rejecting "the market."7 Many who praised the activists' social and environmental goals
nonetheless faulted the protesters for failing to keep those goals in their proper place: as special
supplements to the "economic" goals that normally bring overall gain (maximizing the pie).8 In
this view, progressives can best help market losers (such as American steelworkers, indigenous
peoples, or endangered species) by concentrating on building a better safety net, not by
disrupting efficiency-oriented "free trade" policies.9 Why challenge the market just because
some are left out? The conventional neoliberal wisdom scolds progressives by explaining that if
we derail those engines of economic growth, we will end up with more poverty, more
environmental destruction, more market losers, and weaker social safety nets.10 Rather than
trying to rewrite the rules of international free trade in the interests of American labor or exotic
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sea creatures, progressives should advocate for government resources to retrain or relocate those
Teamsters and turtles to better enable them to live with (or perhaps die less painfully from) the
new rules of the efficient global market.11

But the difficulty of defending, much less expanding, targeted "safety nets" in an
economy driven by neoliberal "market" policies was precisely what motivated much of the
protests. The same "market" arguments insist that in a competitive global economy,
governments cannot afford such to sacrifice "growth" for "equitable redistribution." In the
prevailing neoliberal framework, then, a redistributive "safety net" is both the only cure for the
neoliberal market's devastating casualties, and the critical disease the neoliberal market must
constantly fight off. This double bind legitimates sharp government constraints both upon
protections for "market losers" and upon those "market losers" themselves.

If Teamsters and turtles are "special" interests deserving of compassionate
"redistribution" for failing to measure up in a competition that brings public gain, then they are
likely to continue to get short shrift. In contrast, if the gains to owners and leaders of Enron,
Boeing and Halliburton are identified with successful competition in a publicly beneficial global
market, then their gains will be likely to continue to justify the sacrifices they impose on the
"losing" others. Protesters in Seattle attempted to break through the conventional wisdom's
double bind by reversing the charges, identifying the so-called "market" approach with elite
special interests dependent on lavish government spending and regulatory protection with
devastating costs to public well-being.12

5

II. Defending "Social" Programs Against "Economic" Reforms

Income support programs typically get more attention than international trade
agreements in discussions of social equity in post-New Deal America. But by the late 20th
century, "market" accusations helped justify and mobilize major restrictions in two of the most
prominent U.S. income security programs. First, the 1996 federal "welfare reform" law
eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),13 and second, in the 1990s many
states enacted systemic legislation aimed at reducing the amount and availability of workers'
compensation benefits.14 These two programs represent opposite sides of the conventional
division between redistribution and efficiency. AFDC is the classic redistributive program,
while workers' compensation is the classic model of an efficiency-based safety net scheme. But
both examples show how the division itself serves to undermine progressive goals for increased
economic equity.

A. "Economic" Arguments Against AFDC

In the 1990s, AFDC became a powerful symbol of the failure of progressive anti-poverty
ideas. What transformed this program providing income support for impoverished single parent
families into a substantial threat to the public interest? Many scholars and activists have
described how political support for AFDC eroded as the program moved away from its original
limited focus on white widows and their marital children to provide increased benefits for
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women of color and for divorced or never-married white mothers.15 This evidence supports the
theory that AFDC lost its public virtue because of prevailing ideologies equating the virtuous
public with white privilege and with patriarchal heterosexual marriage.

But much of the debate over AFDC has not focused squarely on weighing the public -and private -- interests in maintaining (or undoing) hierarchies of race, gender, class and sexual
status. Instead, AFDC's threat to the public is often characterized in so-called "market" terms as
a problem of harmful economic incentives, The prevailing wisdom explains AFDC as
"redistribution" that transfers benefits to targeted individuals at the expense of others. Because
such redistribution (by definition) departs from the free market's cost-internalizing exchanges, it
risks producing incentives that decrease overall efficiency. Critics often explain the negative
spillover effects of redistributive programs as the problem of "moral hazard."

Moral hazard is a concept derived from the insurance industry to describe the problem
that protection against risk of loss encourages those protected to take less care to reduce those
losses.16 Critics of AFDC often argued that by giving needy families income support, AFDC
made more families needy.17 In the conventional economic analysis, AFDC's income protection
for single mothers reduced their incentives to avoid the costs of single motherhood by returning
to the wage labor market after childbirth, by avoiding pregnancy and child-rearing, or by
marrying wage-earning men. According to the moral hazard theory, AFDC created a "cycle of
dependency" that, in the long run, hurt both the public in general as well as the needy families
targeted for benefits. This analysis concludes that, despite intentions to benefit society overall,
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AFDC ends up promoting the opposite -- social pathology. This idea of "moral hazard" helped
rationalize the 1996 welfare reform law replacing AFDC with a new family income support
program,18 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).19 TANF restricts benefits to
encourage single mothers to pursue wage labor and marriage and to discourage nonmarital
pregnancy.

But it is political rhetoric, not "economic" method, that leads this "market" approach to
uncover welfare's supposedly inefficient incentive effects. The "moral hazard" argument takes
incentive effects previously recognized and even intended as publicly beneficial and
recharacterizes these effects as harmful, uninformed economics.

First, the incentive effects described as the economic problem of "moral hazard" boil
down to political questions of relative bargaining power. By providing a partial substitute for
wage work (or for wage-earning spouses), welfare programs like AFDC can increase
impoverished mothers' bargaining power -- that is, their relative elasticity of demand for wages
(or for wage-earning spouses). Welfare gives impoverished single mothers a substitute for wage
earning (or for marriage to a wage earner) that therefore makes them less captive "customers" in
the labor (or marriage) market, able to reduce wage labor (or marriage) as their costs rise and to
hold out for higher quality jobs (or spouses). In short, by providing protection against poverty
costs, AFDC decreases incentives for women with children to reduce the costs of their poverty
by marrying or by earning wages. Of course, these incentive effects exist only to the extent that
impoverished single mothers have control over jobs (or spouses), and only to the extent that
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AFDC's income support substitutes for wage income (or wage-earning spouses). Nonetheless, to
some extent and in some contexts, welfare benefits potentially give recipients more bargaining
power with which to refuse work or family arrangements that they believe will interfere with
their well-being.

The purportedly economic term "moral hazard" begs the question why any particular
change in bargaining power is a net societal loss rather than a net societal gain -- a "moral
opportunity," to use the alternative term coined by political scientist Deborah Stone.20 The
question of whether increased bargaining power is good or bad for the overall public interest
turns on prevailing judgments about whether the bargainers are perceived as deserving members
of the public. Early supporters of AFDC explained that society would benefit from enhancing
the bargaining power of widowed white mothers, giving them the power to hold out for better
work and family options.21 In contrast, for many decades after its origin, AFDC's design and
implementation discriminated against African American mothers in order to induce them to
remain in low-waged jobs. For example, as welfare scholars Jill Quadagno and Dorothy
Roberts have discussed, a Georgia Congressman opposed proposals to expand family income
support in the early 1970s by warning, "There's not going to be anybody left to roll these
wheelbarrows and press these shirts."22 As AFDC became less racially discriminatory, and more
publicly identified with never-married or divorced women and with women of color, the
increased bargaining power of welfare recipients became more suspect in the predominant
political view.
Second, arguments about welfare's "moral hazard" also obscure the fact that any
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incentive effects -- changes in bargaining power -- are reciprocal, so that they change the
behavior not just of welfare recipients but also of employers and others.23 Other things being
equal, the presence of AFDC benefits will induce employers to offer higher wages or better
working conditions to employ single mothers who can substitute welfare for work. As those
welfare benefits become less adequate or less readily available, employers' relative bargaining
power increases so that they can shift more of the costs of working to employees -- providing
lower pay (down to the minimum wage) and less favorable working conditions. This protection
for employers potentially spills over to increase costs to many others in society. For example, a
shift in bargaining power from workers to employers might lead to reductions in workers' longterm productivity, as less control over wages, hours and working conditions means a greater toll
on their physical and emotional health. Or, if workers' reduced bargaining power means less pay
or less time for good family care, charities and taxpayers might bear the burden of filling the
gaps. Perhaps the increased supply of low-waged workers and resulting downward wage
pressure would trickle up the wage scale to increase economic insecurity for struggling middle
class families.24

By considering the incentive effects of AFDC on employers as well as on single mothers,
we can see the double standard of prevailing economic analysis: increased bargaining power for
impoverished parents (especially for unmarried mothers of color), but not for employers, counts
as "moral hazard" that reduces aggregate societal resources. Inadequate welfare can create an
arguably vicious cycle of dependency, or a "race to the bottom," whereby employers are
increasingly dependent on keeping workers in poverty to maintain profitable production. If
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cheap and docile labor provides an easy means of avoiding innovations that would lower both
workers' and employers' costs in the long run, then government protection for cheap labor will
encourage employers to lock into business strategies that will make "high-road" production even
more difficult to achieve. In contrast, for example, if better welfare benefits provided an
alternative to low-wage work for Black domestic workers, the men who wear the shirts the
Georgia Congressman feared would not get pressed might instead do the pressing themselves,
perhaps replacing some of their unproductive leisure time. Perhaps the Congressman would
wear shirts needing less costly maintenance. Or perhaps his shirts would be pressed by more
productive commercial laundries employing fewer but more highly paid workers.

Rather than challenging the double standard of prevailing "moral hazard" arguments,
many scholars and advocates have defended welfare by focusing on how to reduce welfare's
supposedly harmful incentive effects. One approach attempts to control welfare recipients'
behavior, turning "redistribution" into a market-like exchange of "reciprocal obligations"
through increased "personal responsibility."25 In contrast, another approach attempts to
exonerate welfare recipients from personal responsibility for supposedly harmful behavior by
more carefully limiting welfare to those whom market incentives are unlikely to reach.26

The 1996 federal law replacing AFDC with more restricted TANF benefits generally
adopts a punitive version of the first "personal responsibility" approach.27 The more progressive
versions of this approach hope to encourage single mothers to engage in more wage work by
redirecting welfare from income grants to work-based assistance, for example through increased
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support for child care, health insurance, or job training.28

But by continuing to construe government support for poor families as "redistribution"
that departs from market responsibilities, progressive arguments for generous work assistance
risk getting caught in a double bind. If such aid appears to give families more for their work
than what they have "earned" in the existing labor market, then that aid likely will be similarly
limited (or combined with further controls on recipients) to encourage even more "personal
responsibility." If the current anti-family low-wage labor market embodies a publicly beneficial
market of reciprocal exchanges, then work-based assistance (like family care assistance) risks
appearing to be an unreciprocated, undeserved gain harmful to the public.

Moreover, the double standard of moral hazard excuses others who benefit from
government assistance from personal responsibility for public harms. Work assistance programs
(such as government-funded child care or health benefits) protect employers from the costs of
low-wage labor, but typically these programs impose no "personal responsibility" on those
employers (or their managers and shareholders) for ensuring reciprocal community gains for this
assistance. This view counts employers' interest in avoiding labor costs as a beneficial public
interest because it is identified with overall market efficiency, while counting impoverished
families' interest in government assistance as undeserved (or only minimally or grudgingly
deserved) redistribution that produces individual gain at the expense of most others.29

A second approach to defending welfare against accusations of harmful incentives relies
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on relieving impoverished families of personal responsibility for public harm. In this view,
progressives can avoid the problem that redistribution changes individual recipients' market
bargaining power by limiting redistribution to individuals who lack meaningful control over their
choices. Some empirical evidence supports the argument that restricting welfare benefits does
not substantially change the work, marriage, or family choices of many impoverished single
mothers.30 The theoretically harmful incentive effects of welfare will be minimal in practice if
impoverished women lack access to work or to working husbands, or to control over their
sexuality or childbearing, or if welfare benefits are too meager or too stigmatized to induce
substantial changes in women's work, marriage, or childbearing behavior. In addition, some
hope to dismiss arguments about the incentive effects of welfare by emphasizing that the primary
beneficiaries are impoverished children, who have little control over -- and therefore little
responsibility for -- their parents' bad choices.31

But this approach to defending welfare against accusations of harmful incentives also
produces a double bind for progressive welfare advocates. If the public good is generally
produced by individuals making free choices in response to market incentives, while welfare is a
redistributive exception for individuals incapable of those socially beneficial choices, then once
again welfare -- and welfare recipients -- are likely to be sharply constrained to avoid threatening
the public interest. In the prevailing view, "innocent" single mothers with little chance of
securing family-supporting jobs or husbands are likely to need not extra freedom from market
demands, but extra government supervision to substitute for market (or masculine) discipline.
The 1996 change from AFDC to TANF reflects and reinforces the view that impoverished
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mothers and children now have a moral and political responsibility to personally bear the costs
of a market that puts good dependent care out of reach of many workers, and good work out of
reach of many parents. Without challenging the assumption that good family life is a privilege
restricted to market winners -- and that market winning is a prime measure of good family life -arguments about impoverished families' innocence are unlikely to inspire much support for aid
from market "winners."32

And if progressives justify welfare as support for impoverished children who cannot help
being born to mothers unsuccessful in the labor or marriage markets,33 then that argument may
reinforce the idea that impoverished children deserve not more income but less parenting from
their "unsuccessful" mothers -- and more supervision from government, depending on their race
and gender status. Following the 1996 welfare reforms, concern for "innocent" children of
impoverished parents has often led not to government help for their parents' wage work or child
care, but to increased government transfer of children from parents to state custody.34

Welfare recipients will rarely be proven "innocent" in a framework that presumes a
double standard for responsibility for the public good. Wealthy capital owners and corporations,
more than low-waged workers and their families, are likely to be automatically excused from
responsibility for harm to workers' families and to society in general. In the prevailing view,
managers' and shareholders' desire to extract more work with less pay from workers is not a
personal choice for enrichment at the expense of others, but instead is a natural and necessary
force emanating from a competitive global market. In contrast, impoverished single mothers'

14

desire to reduce wage work in favor of family care appears not as a natural and necessary result
of inevitable human dependency,35 but as a personal moral failure. The strategy of targeting
economic protection to income losses beyond individual responsibility, without questioning how
the current market distributes responsibility for income losses (often according to class, gender,
and race status), will at best justify only meager, biased, and perpetually suspect welfare
programs.

B. "Economic" Arguments Against Workers' Compensation

Workers' compensation, which provides income replacement and medical benefits for
work-related disability, also became a prominent symbol of the failure of progressive policies in
the late 20th century United States. In the conventional story, workers' compensation originated
in a voluntary political compromise in the early 20th century, when workers gave up their right
to tort suits against employers for occupational injuries and illnesses in exchange for limited nofault compensation of medical costs and lost wages.36 This prevailing story contrasts workers'
compensation to "welfare."37 It is supposedly not charitable redistribution from employers to
workers, but an efficient market bargain that brings reciprocal gains to both, with positive
spillover effects on society as a whole -- reducing consumer prices by producing incentives for
safety and for minimizing administrative costs.38 Workers' compensation, therefore, is the
classic example of a "market" approach to progressive policies, in the conventional wisdom.

But the example of workers' compensation shows that the strategy of locating progressive
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policies within "the market" does not protect those policies from "economic" criticism. If
workers' compensation is designed to achieve efficiency (overall savings), rather than
redistribution (transfers to workers from others), then changes in that supposedly efficient design
will risk upsetting that design.

Advocates of recent workers' compensation reforms often argued that the system had
been converted from its original goals into a "welfare" program requiring employers to subsidize
undeserving workers at the expense of overall economic growth. As with AFDC, the idea of
"moral hazard" helped portray workers' compensation benefits as harmful "redistribution."39 In
the prevailing view, the problem stemmed from well-intentioned efforts to expand compensation
in the 1970s, following a bipartisan federal commission's findings that benefits were inadequate
to satisfy the program's original goals.40 According to this analysis, expanded benefits created
new opportunities for injured workers and their doctors and lawyers to manipulate the system to
reap gains at the expense of others. Instead of simply covering workers' accidental occupational
losses, expanded benefits induced workers to claim more lost income and medical expenses: the
classic moral hazard problem that protection against loss increases risk of loss. In this theory, as
more generous benefits came closer to replacing wages for some workers, and as these more
generous benefits could be tapped as income for doctors and lawyers assisting workers in
making claims, workers had more incentives to substitute workers' compensation for wages or
for non-occupational medical expenses. Moreover, in the conventional wisdom, as workers'
compensation expanded to cover a wider range of workers and occupational accidents and
illnesses, benefit awards became more uncertain and subjective, thereby allowing workers -- and
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their doctors and lawyers -- to get away with claiming benefits for more questionable losses.41

Using this reasoning, reform advocates argued for law reforms that would control
claimant-side moral hazard by reducing benefit awards, by restricting access to claimants'
attorneys and doctors, and by restricting benefits for some types of injuries and illnesses.42 As
with AFDC, the lesson of the conventional story of workers' compensation is that departing from
market principles for social welfare purposes, however well-intended, leads to overall public
harm. But once again, a closer look shows that the harm of "moral hazard" comes not from
objective "economic" fact or "market" principle but from a particular, and particularly
problematic, vision of social welfare.

Again, the incentive effects described as harmful "moral hazard" are simply a matter of
changes in bargaining power that instead can be construed (from a different political or moral
standpoint) as beneficial "moral opportunity." If more generous benefits and benefit claiming
procedures encourage more workers to make more claims for injuries, that could simply mean
that workers are getting compensated for more rightful benefits than they were previously.43 In
the prevailing theory, the change from the 19th century tort system to workers' compensation
was economically "efficient" precisely because it decided to resolve in workers' favor the
longstanding and abundant uncertainties and controversies about the causes and effects of
injuries and illnesses. In place of restrictive fault-based defenses that attempted to limit
employers' share of responsibility for workers' losses, the no-fault workers' compensation system
of strict employer liability was rationalized as a way to shift employers' incentives (and
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aggregate resources) from contesting injury claims to preventing injuries and illnesses -- even
those previously construed as workers' personal responsibility. According to the conventional
"market" theory, the public would benefit overall by giving workers more bargaining power to
encourage employers to assume responsibility for minimizing workers' losses (regardless of
fault).

What turned this incentive effect from moral opportunity to moral hazard? The historical
practice in state workers' compensation systems (as in AFDC) often fell far short of the
professed original goals, thereby dampening any potential incentives for increased employer
responsibility for workplace safety. Narrow definitions of covered injuries excluded many of the
most severe occupational harms, procedural and evidentiary barriers barred many claims, and
benefit awards often fell far below meaningful wage replacement levels. As with AFDC,
progressive advocacy for more equitable benefits in the 1960s and early 1970s led to changes
that addressed some of these concerns and raised the possibility that workers would have more
meaningful gains in bargaining power over the costs of work injuries. But as with progressive
reforms to AFDC, well-funded industry-linked interests countered this shift in bargaining power
with an opposing political and media movement that portrayed benefit recipients as undeserving
"special interests" whose gains hurt overall well-being.

As with AFDC, reform advocates turned the incentive effects of workers' compensation
from moral opportunity into moral hazard in part by dressing up problematic ideas about race,
class and gender as uncontroversial "economics." Commentators and press reports often

18

illustrated their story of workers' compensation's descent from market bargain to welfare fraud
and abuse by contrasting the image of the traditional "deserving" white male industrial claimant
suffering acute, violent trauma with contemporary vignettes questioning the work ethic, honesty
or fortitude of immigrant, female, nonwhite, or low-waged service workers complaining about
minor or "subjective" aches and pains.44

Once again, the focus on controlling supposed benefit abuse obscured the reciprocal
nature of the incentives characterized as "moral hazard."45 As controls on claimant-side moral
hazard make compensation for occupational harm more meager or more costly for workers, these
controls will protect employers and insurers from more of the costs of workers' injuries and
illnesses. Other things being equal, this protection will induce employers and insurers to
decrease safety, re-employment and other work improvements, thereby further shifting the costs
of work accidents onto workers -- and also onto their families, communities and taxpayers.

But by identifying employers and insurers with "the market" -- an invisible force of
nature producing overall well-being -- the conventional view masks their capacity for the
strategic personal gain. "Moral hazard" is transformed into "moral opportunity" by rhetoric
portraying employers and insurers as passive players who automatically deliver claims cost
savings to others through better benefits, more jobs, and cheaper consumer prices.46 In contrast,
because the conventional view locates injured workers' interests outside of that imagined
"market," it can present them as powerful agents capable of manipulating the market to benefit
"special interests."

19

As with AFDC, efforts to defend workers' compensation by focusing on claimant "moral
hazard" remain caught within a double bind. Taking the approach of increasing workers'
personal responsibility, some hoped to enhance support for "deserving" claims by imposing
stronger controls on claimant fraud and by restricting benefits for "subjective" injuries. But
controls on worker-side "moral hazard" are likely to bring further erosion of workers
compensation benefits, not stronger, more accessible and equitable benefits. Workers will have
less power to prove they "deserve" benefits -- or the savings from denying illegitimate benefits -in a system that gives employers and insurers more power to reduce costs by denying benefits as
illegitimate. In fact, substantial evidence supports the theory that recent anti-fraud reforms are
likely to increase employer and insurer moral hazard: employers and insurers may be more
likely to use questionable or fabricated complaints about worker fraud to enhance their profits, to
deny legitimate claims, to lobby for statutory benefit cuts, to avoid correcting safety hazards, and
to discourage workers' demands for less costly work.47
Taking the alternative approach of minimizing workers' personal responsibility for
controlling overall costs, some have advocated giving up on workers' compensation's original
goal of promoting efficiency through incentives for loss prevention.48 Instead, this strategy aims
to redesign workers' compensation to focus solely on distributive goals. For example, some
propose to take the no-fault design further to create a program of more limited compensation for
injuries and illnesses regardless of work-relatedness, financed by taxpayers rather than by
employers.49 This approach aims to avoid the costly complexity and controversy of determining
which claims are legitimately employers' responsibility.
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But if workers' protection from the cost of work accidents counts as government
redistribution, while employers' protection from the costs of work accidents (tort immunity and
reduced compensation benefits) counts as the normally efficient market, then such a "welfarebased" approach reinforces the view that workers deserve only meager or temporary benefits. If
workers depend on taxpayer-funded "welfare" for their protection from work accident costs, then
cuts in that protection will likely seem even more in the public interest than cuts in employers'
protections. Complex and costly controversies about incentive effects will remain -- as the
AFDC example demonstrate -- with the problem simply transferred from controlling illegitimate
"work" losses to controlling illegitimate "disability" losses. And of course, the employer and
insurer interests that resist changes in incentive effects of workers compensation (enhanced
workers' bargaining power) are likely to be similarly effective in organizing and funding
resistance to expanded taxpayer-funded disability programs.

The losing choices -- double binds -- offered by such strategies for defending workers'
compensation against economic criticism might appear to demonstrate that market forces do
inevitably limit progressive goals. But the incentive effects that undermine progressive goals are
natural or necessary only if we presume that elite employers' and owners' interests naturally and
necessarily count more than others' interests in determining the aggregate public interest. By
identifying incentive effects as changes in relative bargaining power, we can see the
"unintended" consequences of progressive policies as problems driven by human agents in
contingent political contexts, not by immutable laws of nature.
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The current global market may well be structured to give many employers substantial
bargaining power to resist attempts to cut their pie slices -- their protection from high workers'
compensation costs, for example. They may be able respond to such demands by threatening to
take the whole pie away -- by automating or moving to a state or nation with less workers'
compensation protection. Or they may be able to augment their pie pieces by reaching for
others' plates -- raising consumer prices, contesting legitimate benefit claims, or lowering
workers' wages.

But whether a market allowing employers and capital owners to hang on to their larger
share of the pie at the expense of others is good or bad for the public overall is a matter of
political ideology, not economic fact. A double standard of moral hazard underlies the equation
of the overall public interest with economic elites' power to extract a losing bargain from others - sacrifice your workers' compensation benefits, or sacrifice your jobs. Employers who seek
legislative protection from their high costs of workers' injuries by threatening to move to a state
(or nation) with lower benefits are typically viewed as engaging in efficient market competition,
not inefficient "moral hazard." Why is employers' ability to shift the costs of occupational harm
to others identified with the normal, or ideal, market that brings aggregate gain, while workers'
ability to shift those costs to employers counts a deviation from that market to enrich special
interests? Because neoliberal "market" arguments use circular reasoning that starts and ends
with the moral premise that employers and owners, but not most workers, can be trusted with
power to divide up the pie for others.
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III. Redefining the Public Interest in Economics

By stripping "economic" discussions about "incentive effects" of their pseudo-scientific
veneer, progressives may be better able to challenge the underlying political vision that claims
the overall public will benefit from a market structured to harm so many. "Balancing" social
equity against market efficiency is a losing proposition because, by tautological definition,
protection against market losses always threatens to disrupt the "efficient" market. Similarly, the
attempt to re-fashion social redistribution to better accommodate "market forces" will require
ever-tighter restrictions to keep equitable benefits, or their beneficiaries, in their place -- that is, a
place where they have diminished power to shape the market in their interest. Helping market
losers will always seem to detract from the public good if that good is primarily identified with a
market structured to direct resources toward an elite few at many others' expense.
This chapter has presented a two-part alternative defense to the accusation that
progressive policies produce incentives distorting efficient markets. This alternative defense
rests on recasting these incentive effects from naturalized market forces to changes in the
distribution of power to extract a better bargain from others -- power that is contingent on the
legal rules that shape the background and foreground of a given market.

First, any charge of harmful incentive effects invites the counter-question of why the
alleged effect -- the change in bargaining power -- is harmful rather than helpful to society
overall. "Moral hazard" can be turned into "moral opportunity" by showing that alleged
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behavior changes amount to diminished bargaining power for certain interests that should not be
assumed to represent public values. In addition, even though progressives should count some
alleged "moral hazard" as fraud or abuse harmful to the public, the further question remains
whether any given approach to policing that fraud and abuse will produce even more harmful
results from those who stand to gain from anti-fraud measures. Controls on benefit fraud in
welfare or workers' compensation (through stiffer penalties or lesser benefits), even if wellintentioned, may in practice also potentially produce harmful incentive effects. Which personal
gain at others' expense counts as societal harm deserving public action -- inefficient moral hazard
-- and which counts as societal gain deserving public deference -- an efficient market "win"? It
depends on whose losses are public versus personal responsibilities. In more practical terms, this
means recognizing and responding to the underlying status assumptions about race, gender,
class, disability and sexuality that shape ideas about whose losses get privileged as public
concerns and whose get penalized as private failings.

Second, an analysis of moral hazard as bargaining power leads to an alternative response
to the argument that market incentives defeat progressive policies by concentrating harmful
effects on those vulnerable groups targeted for progressives' help. The so-called "market forces"
that lash back at progressive attempts to defend or expand social welfare programs are not
necessarily illusory just because they are not the product of inevitable, impersonal economics.
To the contrary, the complex incentive effects of progressive policies demand even more
progressive attention if we understand these consequences to be driven by human rather than
natural law, in the interest of inegalitarian distribution rather than aggregate well-being.
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Progressive hopes for programs like AFDC and workers' compensation get dashed not
because progressive policies inevitably produce smaller pies likely to eventually produce smaller
slices for their intended beneficiaries. Instead, the problem is that these programs often have not
gone far enough to give their beneficiaries bargaining power sufficient to hang on to their
expanded pieces of pie. By recognizing the double standard of moral hazard, we can better
reject the view that progressive policy defeats arise from natural laws of economics -- marketcorrecting incentives that reject redistribution in favor of aggregate well-being. Instead, these
countervailing effects that undermine progressive policies come from inadequate legal controls
on personal gain-seeking by the particular "special" interests likely to lose from progressive
policies. For example, policies that discourage or control capital flight (nationally and
internationally) could decrease the employer "moral hazard" that forces the losing progressive
choice between protecting jobs and protecting workers' compensation benefits. Or different
insurance market structures might better decrease the insurer "moral hazard" that forces a losing
progressive choice between better benefits for injured workers and affordable insurance for their
employers.50

Following that revised understanding of progressive politics' incentive effects, the
progressive goal should be to fashion a "market" -- a political economy -- in which progressive
policies are no longer as costly to their intended beneficiaries. That means progressive policies
may be more practical -- more likely to avoid backlash consequences -- the more their scope
goes beyond targeted efforts to assist the most vulnerable. The lines that hold up the so-called
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safety net are interwoven with the lines that form the market as a whole. "Background" rules
governing "market" matters such as international trade, international finance, tax, business
regulation, and labor regulation are central to progressive strategies for improving social welfare
programs.51

Protection against "market" losses always creates incentives that potentially change "the
market." Instead of trying to reduce or excuse the market-changing incentives of progressive
policies, a progressive vision of a democratic society can embrace those incentives as steps
toward shaping a different -- and better -- market.
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